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2.6., l106aIS-17). From this proposition he draws the
corollary that human virtue is a habit which makes us
good and makes us perform our function well
(1106a21-24).
To prove the general proposition, Aristotle makes
the assertion which has piqued our curiosity:
Similarly the virtue of a horse makes the horse
both good and good at running and at carrying
its rider and at awaiting the enemy (NE. 2.6.,
l106a19-21).1
I

Actually this sentence asserts merely that the virtue of
a horse makes a horse good, and that its virtue makes
its function good. But the sentence clearly implies that
a horse has virtue. 2
Now the implication that a horse has virtue seems
absurd on Aristotle's own account of virtue. On his
account only human beings appear to have the
rationality necessary for the acquisition of virtue.
Aristotle argues that human rationality has two parts.
The one part is theoretical, and the other part practical
(NE. 6. 1., 1139a6-11). Though the theoretical part
cannot, the practical part can create virtue. The
theoretical part only grasps truth, but the practical part
both grasps truth and controls desire. Aristotle explicitly
argues only that the practical part grasps truth and agrees
with desire:

Aristotle presents the reader of his Nicomachean
Ethics with many passages worthy of curiosity. One
passage of this curious sort also happens to be of
interest to those who love animals. This passage

asserts, among other things, that a horse has virtue.
What I wish to do is to ask whether we can take
Aristotle's assertion seriously. We shall see that we
can indeed. This passage will provide us not only with
a new perspective on the classical conception of virtue
but also with a new insight into the admirable virtue
of our equine companions. This new insight in its
tum suggests that animal ethics might find a new basis
in what we today term virtue ethics.
II

We probably ought to begin with a look at the
passage in question. The passage is part of an argument
proving that moral virtue is a habit which lies on a mean.
Artistotle begins the argument with the general
proposition that all virtue brings that which possess it
into good condition and makes its function good (NE.
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He asserts in effect that practical intuition grasps the
ultimate facts and that the ultimate facts include the
principles for the sake of which we act. These principles
are universals which arise from particulars. 3
He is quite explicit about the part concerned with
means. He clearly asserts that deliberation concerns
the means to our ends (NE. 3. 3., 1112b32-34). And he
uses examples from the professions to show that we
assume our ends and'deliberate about our means (NE.
3.3., 1112bl1-16).
And Aristotle argues that when we use our rationality
to act, we are also able to develop habits which
correspond to our actions:

Of the intellect which is theoretical, neither
practical nor productive, the functions which
are good and bad are truth and falsity, for these
are the functions of all intellectual faculties.
Of the intellect which is practical, the good
function is truth in agreement with right desire
(NE. 6. 2., 1139a27-31).
But he also implies that the practical intellect agrees
with right desire because it makes desire right:
The appetitive part in a strong-willed man
obeys a principle. And in the temperate and
courageous man it is even more obedient. For
on all matters it speaks with the same voice as
a principle. (NE. I. 13., 1102b26-28).

In a word habits thus arise out of similar
activities. That is why it is necessary to exhibit
activities of a certain kind. For habits
correspond to differences among these
activities (NE. 2. 1., lI03b21-23).

The practical part would appear to command desire,
for desire obeys its principle in those who are virtuous
or strong-willed.
Indeed our practical intellect so informs desire with
its principle that it makes desire more rational:

Of course the actions to be performed ought not to be
excessive or deficient. They can only be in accordance
with a mean (NE. 2. 2., 1104a20-27 and NE. 2. 6.,
1106a24-1106b7).
We thus see that we must have a practical rationality
with practical intuition and deliberation in order to
develop moral virtue. But rationality of this sort is the
very property which distinguishes us from other
animals. Aristotle makes this fact clear when he defines
the human function:

And if it is necessary to say that the irrational
part has a principle, the part having a principle
will be twofold. The one part has a principle
in the chief sense and in itself, and the other
part has a principle as listening to it as if to its
parent (NE. 1. 13., l103al-3).
The rational part having a principle in the chief sense
would be our rationality, and the rational part having
a principle in the sense of listening to one would be
our desire.
Aristotle also reminds us that our practical
rationality itself divides into two parts. The one part
concerns the ends of our action, and the other concerns
the means to our ends. The part concerned with our
ends is practical intuition. Aristotle is not completely
explicit about what function practical intuition has.
But he does appear to assert that intuition of this kind
concerns practical facts which are principles of action:

What can the human function be? Life appears
to be common to plants. But we seek what is
peculiar to human beings. The life of nutrition
and growth must therefore be excluded. A life
of perception follows. But this life appears to
be common to a horse and an ox and all
animals. A practical life of the part having a
principle then remains (NE. 1.7., 1097b3311098a4).
Please notice that he explicitly cites the horse as an
example of an animal which does not have a rational
life. A horse has only a life of perception and nutrition.
A horse would consequently appear to have only
what Aristotle calls virtue in the natural sense. He
argues that the presence of practical rationality is what
distinguishes virtue in the full sense from virtue in the
natural sense:

The first principles of that for the sake of
which are the ultimate facts themselves, for
from the particulars arise the universals. Of
these, we must therefore have apperception,
and this apperception is intuition (NE. 6. 11.,
1143b4-5).
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punishments. We can thus develop hybrid virtues in an
animal by training it And we may do so even though
an animal does not itself have a rationality enabling it
to develop its own virtue and improve its function. If it
does have rationality, a horse at least does not appear
to have a practical rationality sufficient to develop
virtues for the functions under consideration.4
We need not turn far afield for a confmnation of
our conjecture about horses and their virtue.
Xenophon wrote a treatise on equitation. And though
it is the earliest work extant, his treatise is still
recognized today as authoritative on matters treated
by him. s But more importantly his work illustrates
how we can instill practical principles in a horse and
develop virtues in it. These principles, Xenophon
himself asserts, will enable a horse to perform better
those functions for which it has a capacity (On
Equitation 3. 7-8.).
Because he was concerned with cavalry horses,
Xenophon considers the functions of running and
carrying a rider together. And he accordingly concerns
himself with how to train a horse for the end of
performing military maneuvers. He finds the means
for performing these maneuvers in an enhanced
capacity for running and turning. He consequently
recommends the volte, which is a turning exercise,
and the ellipse, which apparently combines running
and turning:

If a man acquires practical intuition, there is a
difference in his action. His habit will be
similar to natural virtue, but it will be virtue
in the chief sense (NE. 6. 13., 1144bI2-14).
Virtue in the natural sense is only a natural ethical quality:
All people think that each of the ethical
characteristics belongs somehow by nature to
those who have them. For we are just and
temperate and courageous from the moment
of birth (N£. 6. 13., 1144b4-6).
Virtue of this sort especially exists in children and in
other animals (N£. 6. 13., 1144b8-9). In a word, it is
an instinct.
III

But if we take another look at the passage in
question, we can see that the equine virtue under
discussion cannot be virtue in the natural sense. For
this virtue not only makes a horse good, it also makes a
horse good at performing its function. But the functions
.mentioned do not appear to be functions entirely natural
to a horse. Though it can perform them, a horse does
not perform these functions on its own. One surely
would not think that a horse naturally carries another
animal on its back, let alone does so well. Nor would
one be apt to think that a horse quietly awaits its enemy.
One might think that a horse naturally runs well. But
we shall see that it in fact does not.
Aristotle would thus appear to write of some
conception of virtue other than virtue in the strict sense
or in the natural sense. He appears to discuss a
conception of what I shall call a hybrid virtue. What is
a hybrid virtue? A virtue of this sort appears to be a
cross between human virtue in the strict sense and
animal virtue in the natural sense. This virtue is partially
human and partially animal.
But how does a hybrid virtue arise? We have seen
that our practical rationality enables us to grasp a
practical principle and to control our instincts. And
with this understanding and control we can develop
virtue and improve our function. What we shall now
see is that our practical rationality also enables us to
develop virtue in other animals and to improve their
function. We can use our rationality to understand an
animal and to control its instincts through rewards and
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We recommend the exercise called the volle
because it accustoms a horse to turn on both
jaws. To change the direction of the exercise
is also good in order that both jaws may be
balanced by each change of exercise. But we .
recommend the ellipse rather than the circle,
for a horse will tum more gladly, having had
its fill of the stretch. And it will thus practice
straight running and turning at the same time
CEQ. 7. 13-14.).6
He also argues that a horse ought to be trained to stop
and to start all of a sudden (EQ 7. 18.), to be able to run
up, down, and across hills, and to leap up and down
banks and across ditches (EQ. 8. 1.).
When he explains how to turn, he makes explicit
the military principle behind these exercises:
Whenever the horse faces the stretch after
finishing a tum, at that very instant urge it on
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that a colt be accustomed to crowds and to sights and
sounds of all sorts (EQ. 2. 5.).
To supplement what Xenophon has written, we
might briefly consider a modem treatise on equitation.
Harry Boldt has written a treatise on dressage functions
which serve for equestrian competition.? And he too
discusses qualities of the movement of a horse. The
quality most significant for us is straightness. This
quality especially indicates why a horse can run better
after being trained. A horse naturally has a quality called
crookedness, which resembles handedness in a human
being. It causes a horse to favor one side:

at a fast speed. For it is clear that in war turns
are for the sake of attacking or retreating. To
practice running at the fastest speed after making
a tum is therefore a good exercise (EQ. 7. 17.).
To perform sudden stops and starts would also be
useful for attack and retreat (see again EQ. 7. 18.).
And presumably so would the ability to negotiate
uneven terrain.
Xenophon is not all work and no play, however.
He does present some recommendations for dressage
functions, which for him serve in parades. He even
appears to explain how to train a horse for the pasade:

The horse is however naturally crooked. The
hind feet do not track into the hoofprints of
the corresponding front feet. As a rule horses
are crooked from their right hind quarter in
the direction of the left front quarter. That is
to say, the left hind foot will tread in between
the hoofprints of the forelegs and the right hind
foot will tread outside of the right foreleg. The
right hind foot will therefore be placed not
under the belly of the horse but alongside of
the horse (Boldt, ch. 3, p. 114).8

Now when a horse plants its hind legs under
it, if you pull it back with the bit. it will bend
its hind legs at the hocks and raise its front
quarters so that those who are in front can see
its belly and sheath. When it does this, it is
necessary to give it the bit so that it will seem
to those who look on that it performs allan its
own the prettiest feat of a horse (EQ. II. 3.).
And for both campaigns and parades Xenophon also
discusses qualities desirable in the movement of a horse.
He especially recommends collection. This quality
refers to gathering the legs of a horse under it. He argues
that it increases stability in turns:

When straightened with exercises, a horse can run better
and carry a rider better. For it has improved pushing
and carrying ability, and it has greater flexibility and is
more relaxed (Boldt, ch. 3, pp. 114-115).9
We see then that we can use our rationality and its
principles to develop virtues in a horse and to improve its
functions. And we may of course use other principles
besides those of cavalry and dressage. These other
principles would include the principles of working,
hunting, racing, jumping, driving, playing games, and
simply riding. 1O

It is necessary to collect a horse in the turns
because it is neither easy nor safe for it to make
short turns at full speed, especially if the
ground is hard or slippery. When he collects
it, the rider must with the bit allow the horse
to lean as little as possible, and he must lean
as little as possible himself. If not, he must
surely know that trivial things will be sufficient
to cause both himself and the horse to fall flat
(EQ. 7. 15-16.).

IV
Perhaps we ought now to consider some objections
which someone might raise against our conception of
a hybrid virtue. One might ask how an equine virtue
in our hybrid sense could be more than a natural virtue.
Aristotle himself argues that only by its presence does
practical rationality distinguish virtue in the strict sense
from virtue in the natural sense (see again NE. 6. 13.,
1144bI2-14). But we seem to admit that practical
rationality is not present in a hybrid virtue. We use
our own rationali ty to create moral virtue in an animal

He also recommends collecting a horse when leaping
over ditches (EQ. 8. 5.).
By taking it through its paces, a human being can
thus develop virtue in a horse and enable it to perform
better the functions of running and of carrying a rider.
Oddly enough, Xenophon says very little about training
a horse to await the enemy. But he does recommend
that a horse be trained to overcome its shyness of any
object which might be fearful to it (EQ. 6. 14-15), and
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andalsoNE. 2.5., 1l05b25-28). But equine virtue does
rest on a natural function. Xenophon calls this function
a willingness and ability to work (EQ. 3. 12.). Boldt
calls it a readiness and eagerness to work (Boldt, ch. 3,
pp. 70-71). The function is simply the desire of the
horse to run.

which appears to have no rational part. And our
rationality obviously cannot be present in an animal
of such sort.
Our answer to this objection would be that
practical rationality is obviously present in the
rational part of whoever rides a horse. We use our
rationality not only to train a horse but also to guide
a horse after it has been trained. Xenophon himself
implies that we must use our rationality to ride a horse
when he tells us of the one great precept of equitation.
This precept is never to approach a horse in a fit of
anger (EQ. 6. 13.) And Boldt emphasizes that we
must have concentration when we ride. Only good
concentration enables a horse to maintain its
composure (Boldt, ch. 3, p. 118).
We can also see that our rationality is present in
the irrational part of the horse too. For we have instilled
the practical principles of equitation in the habits of
the horse. Indeed Boldt argues that a rider can best
develop concentration and inner calm on a trained
horse (Boldt, ch. 3, p. 118).
We would however note that practical rationality
of a sort lesser than human rationality does appear to
be present in horses, and that a horse can sometimes
use this limited rationality to exercise a hybrid virtue
and perform its function. Stock horses offer a
conspicuous example of this facL. A cutting horse
apparently learns almost by itself how to cut a cow
from a herd. The rider has to guide the horse initially
to give it an idea of what it is to do. But after a few
sessions the rider need only ride, and the horse will
"work on its own." The horse will also gradually
improve its ability to perform this task (Williamson,
pp. 94-96).11
One might also object that moral virtue by definition
requires a mean (see (NE. 2. 2., II04a20-27 andNE. 2.
6., II 06a24-11 06b7), and we have discussed no mean
with regard to training horses. Though we did not
discuss it, equine virtue does however lie on a mean.
Xenophon argues that a horse ought not to be forced to
run too far for its strength. He does so on the grounds
that nothing excessive is pleasant for horses or for
humans (EQ. 10. 14.). Boldt also argues that one ought
not to overexercise a horse. And that every week it
ought to have one or twO days of light work and one
day off (Boldt, ch. 3, p. 170).
Finally, one might object that our hybrid virtue does
not rest on any natural function. For all virtues arise
out of some instinct (See again NE. 6.13., 1144b12-14
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We see then that a horse may have virtue. A horse
may not be able to have virtue in the strict sense, but it
is able to have more than virtue in the natural sense.
What we call a hybrid virtue is a virtue resulting from
our ability to use our rationality to develop good habits
in a horse and to improve its function.
And so we have a new perspective on the classical
conception of virtue. The classical conception of moral
virtue is applicable not only to human beings but also
to other animals. At least to domesticated animals.
Because we can use our rationality to create habits in
them, we can also use this conception of moral virtue
to analyze the habits created in these animals.
We thus appear to have discovered a new basis for
the ethical treatment of domesticated animals.
Because it possesses hybrid virtue, a horse would
appear to be a member of our moral community. And
as we ought to respect the virtue and function of
another human being, so we ought to respect the virtue
and function of a horse. Indeed we have a double
obligation to respect equine virtue. Not only does
virtue of this sort resemble strict virtue, but this virtue
is also a virtue created by us,u
And we now find that several avenues of inquiry
present themselves for further consideration. Another
subject for inquiry would obviously be hybrid vice. To
train an animal to act in an extreme fashion would
clearly be to create a vice in it. And to train an animal
to perform some functions might also make it vicious
(see NE. 2. 6., lI07a8-27). Those who are pacifists
would question the morality of training horses for
military service, for example.
We have also restricted our inquiry only to horses,
but we do domesticate other species, most notably dogs.
And so we might ask what virtue we instill in these
animals. For example, canine virtue would appear to
be a hybrid virtue.
Finally we might ask about breeding animals for
these functions. Are there virtuous and vicious breeds
of horses? Or virtuous and vicious breeds of dogs?
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Notes
I

9 Podhajsky asserts that most horses are naturally straight,
and that the weight of the rider makes them crooked. See
Podhajsky, ch. I, pp. 45-46. But I suspect that the Lippizzaners
are simply horses of a superior breed.

My translations of Aristotle.

2The commentators have very little to say aboutAristotle's
reference to the virtue of a horse. Grant merely refers us to
Republic 1., where Plato presents arguments somewhat
similar. See Alexander Grant, The Ethics ofAristotle, 1885
ed., (New York: Arno Press, 1973), vol. 1, p. 498. Stewart
refers us to Grant. See J. A. Stewart, Notes on the
Nicomachean Ethics, 2 vols., (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1892), vol. 1, p. 192. Dirlmeier suggests that when he here
refers to virtue, Aristotle does not mean a perfect condition
but only a preliminary condition, which leads to perfection.
See Aristoteles, Nikomachische Ethik, trans. and comm.
Franz Dirlmeier, 1956 ed., (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1983),
pp. 309-310. Jolif argues simply that Aristotle uses the term
virtue not in a precise technical sense but in an imprecise
everyday sense. See Rene Antoine Gauthier and Jean Yves
Jolif, L' ethique a Nicomaque, 2nd ed., 2 vols., (Paris:
Beatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1970), vol. 2, pt. 1, pp. 135-136.

10 For an overview of our relationships with horses, one
might consult the Dossenbachs. See Monique and Hans D.
Dossenbach, The Noble Horse, trans. Margaret Whale Sutton
and ed. Margaret Forde, (Boston: G. K. Hall and Co., 1983).

11 Charles O. Williamson, Breaking and Training the Stock
Horse, 6th ed., (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers, Ltd., 1971).

12 Rollin advocates a teleological ethics for animals. But
he advocates a teleological ethics based primarily, if not
exclusively, on biological functions. And these functions
Aristotle would call natural virtue. Rollin thus appears not to
take into account any role our rationality might play in
modifying these functions. See Bernard E. Rollin, Animal
Rights and Human Morality (Buffalo: Prometheus Books,
1981). pt. 1.
I wish to express my gratitude to my equestrian
colleagues at Purdue University and at Bowling Green State
University.
.

3 Contemporary philosophers especially disagree about
how to interpret Aristotle's conception of practical intuition.
For a discussion of alternative interpretations, see Norman
Dahl, Practical Reason, Aristotle, and Weakness of the Will
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), esp.
app.l.

4ln this essay I shall not address the question of whether
horses might have a practical rationality which is less than
human rationality but which nonetheless enables them to
develop good habits of their own.
5 Podhajsky for example speaks very favorably of
Xenophon. He also observes that modern equitation began
in the renaissance with Federico Grisone, who read Xenophon
thoroughly. See Alois Podhajsky, The Complete Training of
Horse and Rider, trans. Eva Podhajsky and V.D.S. Williams,
(New York: Doubleday and Co., 1967), esp. ch. 1, pp. 14-15.
6 My revisions of the translations by Morgan and
Marchant. See Xenophon, The Art of Horsemanship, trans.
Morris H. Morgan, (London: 1. A. Allen and Co., 1962); and
Xenophon, On the Art ofHorsemanship, trans. E. C. Marchant,
Scripta Minora. trans. E. C. Marchant and G. W. Bowersock.
Loeb Classical Library, 7 vols., (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1968), vol. 7, pp. 295-363.

7 Harry Boldt, Das Dressurpferd, ch. 3 trans. Sabine
Schmidt and Dane Rawlins, (Lage-Lippe: Edition
Haberbeck.1978).
8 My amendation of the translation by Schmidt and
Rawlins.
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